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In this report, we summarize several projects exploring h
develops and deploys resistance to scientific and technical expertise.
Majdik and Platt’s “Fight or Flight: X
the Question of Expertise” explores public reactions to the deployment of 
a new airport scanning techno
public that x-ray backscatter machines were safe, but their rollout 
resulted in sudden, vehement, and strong public counter
Notably, these protests occurred even though highly invasive security 
scanning had become a staple of air travel since 9/11. The authors 
investigate what this controversy meant for our understanding, use, and 
practice of expertise (see also Majdik & Keith, 2011a, 2011b).
Whereas Majdik and Platt address a controversy about competing 
visions of expertise, Mehta's “Precaution Ascendant: Implications of 
Precautionary Rhetoric on Public Understanding of Science at the Local 
and National Scales” focuses on rhetorical strategies that leave no role at 
all, even in theory, for expertise. His a
Angeles—the placement of a new subway station beneath one of the city’s 
densest streets—reveals a novel set of arguments used by Beverly Hills 
residents to advocate against a placement that would involve minor 
tunneling under a local high school.
Controversies over issues of expertise develop in situations where a 
complex topos becomes deployed on both sides of an argument. In the 
backscatter machine issue, the 
both sides made use of the term’s multiple meanings. Publics used 
“safety” as a commonplace around which to construct arguments against 
the machines. They argued, for example, that the radiation emitted from 
these scanners may be harmful (or that the opposite
hadn’t been proven adequately); they also argued that the new scanning 
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technology did little to ensure the safety of aircraft operations. The 
Department of Homeland Security and Transportation Security Agency, 
meanwhile, justified the use of their machines through the same central 
topos of safety, by asserting that the machines ensure the safety of aircraft 
operations and that x-ray scans are safe for travelers. 
Safety was also a commonplace in the Beverly Hills subway 
controversy. Discussions became heated when in hearings with 
transportation planners and professionals, residents argued that they 
needed absolute guarantees, not only of physical safety but also of silence, 
lack of vibration, and other existing aspects of the environment. In other 
words, Beverly Hills residents equated “safety” with a lack of disturbance. 
Debate thus revolved around defining and then deploying the topos of 
‘safety’ either narrowly, via scientific reasoning, engineering, and 
planning, or more broadly.  
While clashes over expertise are fought about substantive issues, they 
also become waged—sometimes exclusively—over how and where claims 
to expertise ought to be legitimized and grounded. Conflicts over 
expertise tend to focus on stasis over two dimensions of risk: empirical 
danger and the acceptability of danger. Empirical danger refers to 
calculable likelihood of harm, acceptability of danger to the willingness of 
the people exposed to continue an activity despite such risks (along 
multiple types of cost: physical, financial, political, and cultural) (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1983). Thus, the conditions of risk around which questions 
of expertise are contested have a technical and moral dimension. The use 
of ‘safety’ in both cases speaks to this division, as ‘safety’ implies both a 
calculable dimension of danger and a normative dimension of how 
acceptable that danger is in particular situations to constituencies 
affected by them. 
This difference leads to two distinct rhetorical attempts to assert 
where expertise lies. Arguments for locating expertise are either asserted 
through epistemic registers focused on the empirical aspects of risk (“we 
know best what’s best for you, generally”) or through appeals to phronetic 
practice (reasoning through practical wisdom) focused on the moral and 
social dimension of risk (“we know best what’s best and most acceptable 
for us, in this particular situation”). We find both of these approaches in 
the controversies we discuss. Advocates of the current systems—x-ray 
backscatter machines, subway expansion tunnel plans—appropriated the 
scope and defined the meaning of the ‘safety’ topos along epistemic 
registers that exist relative to established standards and accreditations. 
But experts did not have a monopoly on expertise.  Proponents defined 
the topos along phronetic registers that sought to limit the use of ‘safety’ 
to the particularities of the situation, audience, and practices. 
Struggles over expertise manifest themselves rhetorically in several 
ways. One is an invocation of conceptual systems versus material 
practices. We find, for example, in the x-ray backscatter study multiple 
instances where an assertion of expertise relative to epistemic registers is 
made by reference to conceptual systems (e.g., emphases on the statistical 
likelihood of “glitches” over normal functioning, or comparative analogies 
to other types of generally held knowledge or generally practiced 
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activities). At the same time, those who argue for a kind of expertise that 
resides in phronetic practices refer to material practices (e.g., emphases 
on the physically or otherwise tangibly experienceable implications of 
practices within existing systems/plans, often reinforced by metaphors 
like “cancer cluster” pointing to the physical manifestations of invisible 
radiation energy). Relatedly, we find in this latter category a distinct 
concern with questions of visibility. The lack of use of dosimeters by TSA 
agents in the so-called ‘cancer cluster’ at Logan led agents to express 
concerns because of their resultant inability to ‘see,’ and thus be able to 
prove or disprove through demonstration-in-practice, the material 
existence of empirical danger. 
The phronetic approach to expertise therefore involves the idea that, 
while there are no universally ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ uses of expertise in a given 
situation or who can be assumed to possess it, there are better and worse 
uses of expertise. Appeals to this type of expertise are characterized by a 
grounding of claims in material uses and practices--a making-available of 
materially grounded arguments to deliberations about the locus of 
expertise. Conversely, the same argumentative mechanisms are denied to 
the opponents of x-ray scanners. Epistemically oriented expert systems 
counter claims with conceptual ideas, focused on an ideal norm (as it 
exists within epistemic considerations of the case) that invalidate or 
minimize the importance of the opponents’ concerns.  
We find similar rhetorical characteristics in the Beverly Hills case, 
albeit with a different and opposite critical outcome. In this case, 
opponents couched their claims in highly precautionary terms that assess 
placement of the tunnel only in terms of worst cases (Ewald, 2001). This 
criterion allowed the opponents to suggest that its placement might make 
the high school a prime target for terrorist attacks, despite the large 
amount of earth buffering the school from the proposed tunnel and the 
nearby presence of more populated targets such as universities, business 
districts, and residential towers (Wilen, 2010). This line of argument 
assigns infinite, exclusive, and equal values both to the lives of students 
and to their educational experience, by implying that even minor noise 
disruptions to the school during a brief period of construction would 
irreparably damage students and that there is no conceivable set of 
benefits that could justify such disruptions. By equivocating such claims 
with claims about physical safety, opponents could close off any 
considerations of other benefits from a subway expansion to populations 
beyond the Beverly Hills schools. In doing so, residents of Beverly Hills 
eliminated any role for expertise, by suggesting that possibility, not 
probability, is the key issue in siting debates. Remarkably, this occurred 
even in a situation that revolved around scientific and technical experts—
for instance, environmental scientists assessing soil conditions and 
engineers outlining the refinement and safety of tunnel boring 
technology. 
Precautionary arguments, Mehta argues, allowed residents of Beverly 
Hills to voice strong and virtually unified opposition to the subway 
placement while avoiding some claims of NIMBY (Not In My BackYard)-
ism, because it allowed them to use the language of science without 
actually allowing a contributory role for scientists. However, such 
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reasoning is particularly problematic when applied to what are 
fundamentally local and temporally limited problems, since precaution 
arises from, and is largely a reaction to extended, global problems such as 
nuclear proliferation or climate change (Wingspread Conference, 1998). 
In addition to being highly self-contradictory, such logic would also be 
highly corrosive to any debate involving scientific expertise—essentially, 
all public debates—if allowed to spread, because it would create a perverse 
disincentive to hide information and would strongly disfavor open 
hearings such as those conducted by transportation and city planners. 
In sum, looking at the two cases, we can see something about the 
rhetorical functions of expertise in the public space. Namely, we find a 
change in understanding expertise from a concept that exists only in 
reference to specialized knowledge to a concept that exists and is 
demonstrated in actual, particular, and situation-specific use and 
practice. This is demonstrated vividly in instances where danger is 
invisible--such as those involving energy (x-rays) or future plans (in 
political, deliberative settings). Managing the risk (thus, the 
acceptability) of such dangers requires either trust in expert systems, 
where expertise exists relative to epistemic concepts (similar to how 
Giddens, (1991, pp. 10–34) discusses it), or a rhetorical making-visible of 
dangers by embedding them or by making them available in concrete uses 
and practices. 
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